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Procedural Injustice: How the Practices 
and Procedures Of The Child Welfare System 
Disempower Parents And Why It Matters
by Vivek Sankaran and Itzhak Lander Ph.D 
Introduction
Many of us appear surprised when families in-
volved in the child protective system do not reunify. 
A parent’s path to reunifi cation seems straightforward. 
Upon a fi nding of neglect, the court prescribes a basic 
regimen, typically consisting of parenting classes, 
counseling, drug testing, and a psychological evalu-
ation, that a parent must fulfi ll prior to having the 
child returned to his/her custody. If a parent success-
fully completes these seemingly minimal require-
ments, the law requires reunifi cation unless the return 
poses a “substantial risk of harm” to the child.1 With 
such high stakes involved, a clearly defi ned path for 
success, and the prospect of termination of parental 
rights looming over them, parents have every incentive 
to complete these requirements quickly and succeed 
in the overwhelming majority of cases. One would 
expect parents, fi ghting zealously for their children, to 
diligently complete court-mandated requirements and 
promptly reunify with their children. Th is is the child 
protective system we strive to achieve. Th is goal is em-
bodied in the Michigan Juvenile Code, which states 
a preference that a child coming within the court’s 
jurisdiction “receives the care, guidance, and control, 
preferably in his or her own home.”2 
Yet, today, we fi nd ourselves far removed from this 
aspiration. Nationally, only 54% of children exit-
ing foster care are returned to their parents’ custody.3 
Local statistics paint an even darker picture of real-
ity. Over 60 percent of children removed by the 
Michigan Department of Human Services (“DHS” 
or “Department”) do not return home within a year.4 
For families under the supervision of a private child 
welfare agency, that number rises to approximately 
70 percent.5 Nearly half of all families never reunify.6 
And, as has been highly publicized, over 6,000 
children remain in the Michigan foster care system 
as permanent court wards whose parents’ rights have 
been terminated but who still await adoptive homes.7 
Th ese statistics present a system that has failed in 
facilitating the prompt reunifi cation of children with 
their parents. Somewhere soon after the child protec-
tive case is initiated, many parents become disengaged 
in the process, fail to complete services, and drop out 
of their child’s life. 
Why has this systemic failure occurred? Certainly 
the complex myriad of problems confronting parents 
such as drug use, mental illness, and domestic violence 
often creates insurmountable barriers that may take 
years to overcome. In a very small number of cases, 
the seriousness of the abuse or neglect warrant a wise 
decision by the DHS and the court to immediately 
terminate the legal relationship between the parent 
and the child.8 In others, the Department fails to 
provide quality services to parents in a timely manner. 
In many cases, parents are willing and able to reunify 
with their children with the provision of services 
which may be available, yet they ultimately fail. Th is 
failure occurs, in part, due to the ways in which the 
procedures used by the child protective system discon-
nect and alienate parents from the decision mak-
ing process involving their children. Th is process of 
disempowerment occurs immediately upon the fi ling 
of a child protective petition, a time during which 
allegations of abuse or neglect have not been proven, 
and continues until parental rights are terminated. 
At every possible opportunity, the system impresses 
upon parents, most of whom come from traditionally 
disenfranchised populations,9 that they are no longer 
capable of raising their children, and does this by 
silencing their voices both in and out of court and giv-
ing them little control over the process. Th e emascula-
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tion is complete when parents completely disengage 
with the system which permits judges to terminate 
their rights and consider other “permanency” options 
for children. To the extent that the child protective 
system is serious about reunifying children with their 
parents, many of its practices and procedures un-
dermine that objective. Th is dissonance, which has 
signifi cant repercussions for child welfare policy, will 
be explored.
Procedural Justice  
Th e “straightforward” picture of the system painted 
at the outset of this article masks the complex relation-
ships in a child protective case between the parent, the 
Department, and the court. Th e challenges confront-
ing child welfare professionals are profound. Typically, 
a parent becomes enmeshed in the court system after 
the Department either has removed or seeks to remove 
children from his/her custody.10 At this juncture, 
parents are angry, frustrated, and frightened about the 
prospects of losing their children to a system in which 
strangers will raise them. Th ey lack any confi dence 
in the Department and the court that has just autho-
rized the removal and are confused about what will 
happen next. Often, these parents appear hostile and 
confrontational as they have been stripped of the most 
important piece of their lives—their children. Few of 
us would behave any diff erently.
Th e challenge facing the child welfare system lies 
in motivating parents, completely disillusioned with 
the process, to accept and comply with a series of 
mandates issued by a department and court that the 
parent has already deemed to be antagonistic due to 
the sudden, traumatic removal. Upon removal, the 
parent often loses confi dence in the decision making 
process, and procedures to re-establish its legitimacy 
from the parent’s perspective must be implemented to 
bolster the chances for reunifi cation. Th e task of estab-
lishing a system to achieve these goals is daunting yet 
attainable. Research in the fi eld of social psychology, 
described generally as “procedural justice,” instructs 
us on how exactly we might promote this delicate 
balance of engendering trust in a seemingly hostile 
relationship between the parent and governmental 
authorities.
Repeated studies by social psychologists pro-
vide compelling evidence that a key determinant in 
retaining the support of those receiving unfavorable 
outcomes is the utilization of fair procedures to make 
decisions.11 Surprisingly, although an individual’s will-
ingness to accept authorities’ decisions is shaped by 
the favorability of outcomes, research shows that out-
come favorability is not the only, or even major, factor 
shaping acceptance and satisfaction.12 Both trust in 
the motives of authorities and judgments about the 
fairness of procedures they use are stronger infl u-
ences on acceptance and satisfaction than achieving a 
particular outcome in a case.13 Th ese fi ndings provide 
hope that courts and agencies can achieve voluntary 
compliance with orders and recommendations even 
when taking actions in the short term that may run 
contrary to the parents’ interests.
In assessing what is “fair,” litigants look to a 
number of factors. Most importantly, procedures that 
permit individuals to present arguments and to exert 
control over the process are deemed just, whereas 
those that silence litigants only exacerbate feelings of 
mistrust.14 Central to these fi ndings is a person’s need 
to have his story told, regardless of whether the tell-
ing will ultimately impact the outcome of the case.15 
Fairness is also enhanced by adequate representation 
and confi dence that the decision-maker is neutral and 
unbiased.16 Courts that reaffi  rm one’s self-respect and 
treat people politely while respecting their rights earn 
the trust of those before it, regardless of the substance 
of the orders it issues.17 
Why is the satisfaction of litigants important? 
Research demonstrates that greater satisfaction with 
the process signifi cantly increases the likelihood that 
litigants will comply with the mandates of authorities, 
even when those authorities are taking actions which 
may be detrimental to the interests of those individu-
als.18 Th is result is particularly salient in child protec-
tive cases in which a fi nding of neglect only represents 
the beginning of the case and the ultimate outcome 
depends largely on the willingness of the parent to 
obey the dictates of others.19 Parents must comply 
with case service plans and court orders to eff ectuate 
the child’s return home. Satisfaction with the process 
helps child welfare authorities achieve voluntary com-
pliance with treatment requirements.
Designing a child protective system based on 
principles of procedural justice would invest more 
parents in the process and enhance the legitimacy of 
the various decision makers ranging from judges to 
social workers. 
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What would be the key elements of such a sys-
tem? Parents would be represented zealously by able, 
adequately-compensated counsel, who would present 
their stories to the court. Th e court, which would 
treat parents with the utmost of respect, would give 
them the opportunity to present evidence regarding all 
aspects of the case, including their story of what hap-
pened and what they need to reunify with their chil-
dren. Judges, mindful of the power imbalance between 
parents and the Department,20 would carefully and 
patiently listen to each party’s story and meticulously 
follow court procedures and evidentiary rules prior to 
making just determinations regarding the family. 
Outside of court, caseworkers would meet regu-
larly with parents and consider their input prior to 
developing and updating case service plans aimed at 
assessing the family’s strengths and needs, and pre-
scribing services to address any defi cits. Lawyer-guard-
ians ad litem would work to understand the parent’s 
perspective, prior to rendering an opinion on what is 
best for the child, by regularly meeting with the par-
ent and other members of the extended family. And, 
of course, parents would have regular access to their 
attorneys, who would advocate on behalf of the parent 
and serve as the conduit of the parent’s perspective. 
In all aspects of the child protective case, the parent’s 
voice would be heard, and his/her opinion would be 
respected. A child protective system based on princi-
ples of procedural justice would not require rendering 
outcomes based solely on the parent’s wishes. It would 
simply empower parents and validate their experiences 
by giving them a voice and input in the process.
Procedural Injustice
Today’s child protective service, however, lacks at-
tributes refl ecting procedural justice values for parents. 
Although laws exist aff ording parents procedural 
protections and rights, in practice, these guarantees 
have been vitiated, leaving parents with few, if any, op-
portunities to participate meaningfully in the develop-
ment of their case. Statutory and constitutional rights 
to parents’ counsel have been eviscerated by delayed 
appointments, low pay, and high caseloads. Relaxed 
advocacy and procedural shortcuts have been justi-
fi ed by effi  ciency considerations and by furthering the 
amorphous “best interests of the child.”21 Receiving 
parental input on important decisions has been re-
placed with decision making based on the opinions of 
third-party professionals, many of whom lack mean-
ingful relationships with the family. Each of these 
factors, among others, contributes to a system that 
disempowers parents, increases their dissatisfaction 
with the process, and reduces the likelihood that they 
will complete services and reunify with their children. 
Some are highlighted below.
Right To Counsel
Attorneys are their clients’ voice in the courtroom. 
Th ey play a crucial role in conveying their clients’ 
perspective to the court, zealously advocating for that 
position in all proceedings, and protecting the sac-
rosanct constitutional rights at stake. As observed in 
Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge:
Parents most often involved in neglect and 
termination proceedings are usually the least 
equipped, in terms of intellectual and emotional 
resources, to respond to such proceedings. Th e 
indigent are frequently the least able to cope 
with government in its offi  cial functions. Th e 
case at bar was routine for the welfare workers 
and other juvenile court staff . For the indigent 
mother, however, the entire proceedings were 
incomprehensible.22
 
As such, in Michigan, a parent has an unquali-
fi ed right to counsel, which is recognized in statute, 
court rules, and case law. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 712A.17c (West 2002) explicitly provides a parent 
with “the right to an attorney at each stage of the pro-
ceeding” and “the right to a court-appointed attorney 
if the respondent is fi nancially unable to employ an 
attorney.”23 Not only does such a right exist, but at-
torneys representing parents must be eff ective, compe-
tent, and diligent.24 Th e full panoply of responsibili-
ties mandated by the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct applies to parents’ attorneys, who are subject 
to disciplinary actions if they deviate from the rules. 
In practice, however, a parent’s right to eff ective 
counsel has yet to be fully recognized. Whether a 
parent receives court-appointed counsel at the outset 
of the child protective case varies across the state. 
Custodial parents are only represented by attorneys 
in approximately 60 percent of removal hearings and 
50 percent of non-removal hearings.25 For non-custo-
dial parents, that number drops to 30 and 20 percent 
respectively.26 “If the parent . . . is not represented at 
all at the preliminary hearing, decisions to remove 
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the child can appear arbitrary, and parents may feel 
that they do not know how to speak to the jurist to 
explain their situations.”27 In certain counties, such 
as Genesee County, as a matter of practice, no parent 
receives the assistance of court-appointed counsel at 
the preliminary hearing. Th ese jurisdictions typically 
appoint attorneys weeks after the preliminary hearing 
after critical decisions in the case have already been 
made, including the child’s removal from the home 
and placement into care.28 In contrast, statistics reveal 
that children are appointed lawyer-guardians ad litem 
to represent their “best interests” in over 90 percent of 
cases in which removal is requested.29 
Appointment of counsel by itself, however, does 
not necessarily lead to eff ective representation because 
of extremely low rates of compensation. No statewide 
standards exist establishing a baseline compensation 
for parent’s attorneys, and thus, practice varies among 
counties.30 While some counties pay attorneys an 
hourly rate, many, including the counties which have 
the largest foster care populations in the state, includ-
ing Wayne County, Oakland County, and Genesee 
County, compensate parents’ attorneys by hearing or 
stage of the case. For example, in Genesee County, 
attorneys are paid $300 if their clients enter a plea, ap-
proximately $450 if the case goes to trial, and $50 per 
review hearing. In Oakland County, lawyers receive 
$300 for a plea, $450 for a trial, and $120 for review 
hearings. Similar payment structures are utilized in a 
number of the larger counties.31
Th e disincentives to zealous lawyering created by 
this structure are transparent. Attorneys are encour-
aged to practice relaxed advocacy, do little work out-
side of the courtroom, and push their clients towards 
entering into pleas. As described above, in Genesee 
and Oakland Counties, an attorney only receives an 
extra $150 to go to trial if his client does not enter 
into a plea despite the substantial amount of prepara-
tion a trial entails including drafting examinations, 
preparing witnesses, and subpoenaing documents. At 
the review hearing stage, if an attorney spends one 
hour a week on a parent’s case between hearings, a 
conservative average, his hourly billing rate, based 
on the $50 payment, would come out to under $4 
per hour, well below the minimum wage. And, if a 
parent’s attorney engages in creative lawyering and 
gets the Department to dismiss a case prior to the 
court’s assumption of jurisdiction, he runs a high risk 
of not being paid for his eff orts. Under this system, 
the only way a parent’s attorney can make a living is 
to maintain high caseloads and limit the extent of his 
advocacy for any one client.  
Not surprisingly, this skewed system has aff ected 
the quality of legal assistance parents receive. Attor-
neys maintain caseloads in the hundreds, and in some 
courthouses, substitution of counsel is routine due to 
scheduling confl icts.32 As one person observed:
[P]arents’ attorneys in Wayne County meet in 
the cafeteria and ‘deal the morning’s cases like 
cards,’ trading cases back and forth based on 
who is going to be in which courtroom that day. 
Attorneys who work on these cases in Wayne 
County generally are not able to do other kinds 
of work and must maintain high caseload num-
bers to assure themselves adequate income. If a 
parent’s attorney is not available at the time of 
the hearing, the parent is off ered house coun-
sel—an attorney who is on call for that day and 
who is assigned to come in to the hearing with-
out ever having seen the case fi le or ever having 
met the parent.33
Client contact also appears to be infrequent. One-
third of judges responding to a statewide survey report 
that parents’ attorneys rarely speak to their clients be-
fore hearings.34 Attorneys themselves report that often 
they cannot meet their clients in their offi  ces and must 
talk to them in the lobby or outside of the courthouse 
just before the hearing.35 Without frequent contact 
with their clients, it is diffi  cult to comprehend how 
any meaningful advocacy can occur. 
Statistics reveal that relaxed advocacy has become 
the norm in the system. Decisions to remove a child 
from the home are rarely challenged, and the over-
whelming majority of child protective cases resolve in 
pleas. 36 Michigan is one of three states in the country 
that provide parents with the right to a jury trial at 
the jurisdiction stage, yet in 2005, jury verdicts were 
rendered in fewer than 1 percent of cases. 37 In con-
trast, parents pled to allegations against them in nearly 
4,000 cases.38 Similarly, despite clear statutory provi-
sions mandating that the court inquire in each case as 
to whether the Department made “reasonable eff orts” 
to prevent the removal of children from their home 
and to fi nalize the child’s permanent placement, these 
fi ndings are rarely challenged by parents’ attorneys.39 
Over 90 percent of judges have rarely or never found 
that the Department failed to make reasonable eff orts 
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despite signifi cant evidence about the availability of 
appropriate services for parents in the system.40 Proce-
dural protections provided to parents under State law 
are not being exercised because the right to counsel 
has not been fully enforced. 
Not surprisingly, parents themselves provide the 
most blistering critique of their representation. Parents 
report that their attorneys do not return phone calls 
or provide them with contact information.41 Attor-
neys fail to explain what is happening in their cases, 
and do not give parents a chance to tell their story 
at court hearings and make deals without consulting 
them.42 Parents also confi rmed that often, their only 
contact with their attorneys, if any, occurs for a few 
minutes before hearings.43 Consequently, they are left 
confused about what is happening.44 As summarized 
in the 2005 Court Improvement Project Reassessment 
Report, “What was reported to evaluators in this reas-
sessment and what was observed in court hearings fall 
disturbingly short of standards of practice.”45
Th e right to counsel plays a crucial role in enforc-
ing standards of procedural justice in any court process. 
Yet, in child protective proceedings, the system has left 
this right hollow for parents accused of maltreatment. 
Although many practitioners who work in this fi eld are 
passionate and talented, the conditions in which they 
must practice prevent them from engaging in the level 
of advocacy that is needed to empower parents and give 
them a sense of control over the process. Th e system’s 
refusal to embrace the importance of legal advocacy on 
behalf of parents only contributes to the resentment, 
frustration, and hostility that parents inevitably feel 
towards those making important decisions.
Other Forms Of Disempowerment
 Th e failure to fully recognize the parent’s right 
to counsel is only one manifestation of the many ways 
in which the child protective system denies parents 
their dignity and silences their voices. Upon the initia-
tion of a case, parents may fail to receive notice of the 
preliminary hearing. When they arrive at court, they 
wait for hours in a crowded waiting room prior to 
their case being called.46 Often, seats are a premium, 
and no space exists for parents to speak privately with 
their attorneys or case workers.47 Th e following typi-
fi es the experience of many:
Evaluators observed that the lobby waiting area 
became crowded with many people having to 
stand up because there were so few seats. In 
this area, there was chaos, noise, and a lack of 
privacy. Names were called over a loudspeaker 
which was heard throughout the waiting area so 
everyone present learned the names of the other 
persons before the court. Attorneys generally 
had to talk to clients in the lobby or outdoors. 
Because of the lack of meeting rooms, attorneys 
spoke openly about private family matters in 
the waiting area in the presence of strangers. 
Sometimes a person came to the waiting area 
and said in front of others something like “your 
drug test came back OK.”48
Once the hearing begins, the parent may or may not 
be represented by counsel,49 and the process is short 
and perfunctory. Th e Department’s version of the facts 
is generally accepted,50 and more time may be spent 
during the hearing trying to make the appropriate 
“reasonable eff orts” and “contrary to the welfare” fi nd-
ings necessary to preserve eligibility for federal fund-
ing than on pressing issues like placement, visitation, 
and the immediate provision of services for the family. 
A lawyer-guardian ad litem, who, in all likelihood, has 
had little opportunity to conduct any investigation 
of the matter or to meet with the child, is off ered a 
chance to present what is “best” for the child, but few 
opportunities exist during the hearing for the par-
ent to voice his/her concerns about what is happen-
ing. A clear message is sent through this process: Th e 
opinions and wishes of the parent are not important 
or relevant to the decisions being made by the court 
about the child.
As the case continues, the parent is further stripped 
of control over the process. State law requires the De-
partment to prepare an initial service plan within 30 
days after a child’s removal from the home.51 Depart-
ment policy requires the engagement of the parent in 
the drafting of the plan, which means an open conver-
sation between the parent and social worker to discuss 
needs and strengths and to reach an understanding 
of what is entailed in meeting the goals of the service 
plan.52 Th e Department itself notes that “[p]arental 
engagement is an invaluable tool for achieving early 
return home of children from foster care.”53
Unfortunately, the development of the case service 
plan is another area in which parental involvement 
has been stifl ed. A 2005 report issued by the Foster 
Care Review Board found that in a majority of cases 
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reviewed, the plan was unsigned by parents and the 
vast majority of parents felt that they had little input 
and that the elements of the plan were essentially 
decided by the case worker.54 Th ese conclusions have 
been corroborated by other sources. Th e Federal Child 
and Family Services Review (CFSR) found that in 30 
percent of cases reviewed, diligent eff orts were not 
made to involve parents in the case planning pro-
cess.55 Similarly, a statewide assessment discovered that 
parents were not involved in approximately 40 percent 
of treatment plans.56 Th e CFSR also concluded that 
the DHS, in part due to the lack of parental involve-
ment, failed to eff ectively address the service needs of 
families in 27 percent of the cases investigated.57 
Th e systematic practice of shutting parents out 
of decision making extends beyond the development 
of the service plan. Both state and federal law man-
date parental involvement, and often consent, before 
making educational and medical decisions regarding 
their children, even when the child is in the foster care 
system. Th e Individual with Disabilities and Educa-
tion Act (IDEA) preserves a parent’s authority to 
make educational decisions until the child is a “ward 
of the State,” at which point a surrogate parent may 
be appointed.58 State law requires the parent’s consent 
before any non-routine, elective, or surgical treatment 
of the child.59 DHS policy mandates parental permis-
sion before a child can enroll in a private school or be 
home schooled.60 
Yet, experience and documented stories tells us 
that parental involvement of this type is rarely seen in 
today’s foster care system.61 Instead, once the case is 
petitioned, child welfare professionals, with the best of 
intentions, immerse themselves in the family’s back-
ground and independently determine what is best for 
the child, excluding family members from the process. 
Despite having a statutory mandate to “interview 
family members,”62 lawyer-guardians ad litem rarely 
consult with parents prior to making a “determination 
regarding the child’s best interests.”63 Meetings are 
held, decisions are made, and a child’s life is altered, 
yet the opinions of those closest to the child are often 
not considered. Rather than engaging in a coopera-
tive process in which the parent provides substantial 
input into identifying and addressing defi cits, in 
practice, parents are simply told what they need to do 
in a formulaic fashion without consideration of their 
individual needs. 
A fi nal example of a way in which the system 
erodes the decision making control of parents lies in 
the court’s ability, under Michigan law, to assume 
jurisdiction of a parent’s child without a fi nding of 
parental unfi tness against that parent. Th e law cur-
rently permits family courts to obtain jurisdiction or 
temporary custody of a child based solely on a plea or 
fi nding of unfi tness against one parent.64 Th e Juvenile 
Code, as interpreted by the case law, even allows a 
court “to enter an order placing the children outside 
of the custodial parent’s care whose neglect did not 
factor into the assumption of jurisdiction over the 
child.”65 Under this interpretation, a custodial par-
ent who has done nothing to harm her child could be 
deprived of total decision making authority over her 
child based solely on fi ndings made against a non-cus-
todial parent who may have had minimal contact with 
the child. Th is deprivation, even if contested, could 
occur without an evidentiary hearing, which is not 
required under the law after fi ndings are made against 
one parent.66 Afterwards, the extent of the custodial 
parent’s ability to infl uence any of the educational, 
medical, and placement decisions of the child would 
be at the whim of the trial court judge. Th e case law 
demonstrates numerous examples of parents being 
shut out of the decision making process through 
the application of this statutory regime.67 Th is is yet 
another example of how the procedures used by our 
child protection system alienate and disempower those 
whom the system is trying to help.
Conclusion
Th e discussion above is not intended to paint a 
comprehensive picture of the ways in which the proce-
dures employed by the system undermine the goals of 
family reunifi cation, but is meant to merely highlight 
the problem. Much more work in the area is needed. 
Recent initiatives, such as the Family to Family Pro-
gram funded by the Casey Foundation are attempting 
to reverse these longstanding practices. Among other 
goals, the initiative seeks to involve birth parents in all 
decisions to “ensure a network of support for children 
and the adults who care for them.”68 As part of this 
program, team decision making meetings, consisting 
of parents, extended family, and community members, 
along with child welfare professionals, are convened 
prior to a change in a child’s placement. Th e “Parent 
Partners” program, implemented in Wayne County, 
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matches parents with others who have successfully 
reunifi ed with their children, to help show them that 
they have control over the process. Th ese programs 
demonstrate great potential in restoring strength in 
the family, yet they are early in their limited imple-
mentation, and their eff ectiveness has yet to be evalu-
ated fully. Regardless, the principles underlying the 
program demonstrate the importance of recognizing 
the role that parents, even after allegations of abuse are 
made, should play in the rearing of their children.
Others measures, of which a comprehensive discus-
sion is beyond the scope of this paper, must be taken 
as well. In short, I recommend creating a statewide 
task force, with leadership from the judiciary, legisla-
ture, and the Department of Human Services, to con-
duct a comprehensive assessment of how procedures 
used in child protective cases silence the voices of 
parents. Membership on the task force must include 
parents’ attorneys and parents themselves. After con-
ducting the assessment and widely disseminating the 
results, the task force can discuss areas in need of im-
provement including strengthening a parent’s right to 
counsel, making statutory changes to enhance parental 
input in judicial and administrative decision making, 
restructuring court facilities and processes to reinforce 
a parent’s dignity and self-respect, and improving the 
practice of attorneys and case workers to incorpo-
rate the views of parents and other family members. 
Creating an institutional offi  ce to represent parents 
and to provide support to parents’ attorneys similar 
to the Center for Family Representation in New York 
City69 or Community Legal Services in Philadelphia70 
would be a logical fi rst step. Specifi c measures such as 
establishing a reasonable, uniform rate for compensat-
ing parents’ attorneys and capping caseloads, creating 
a statewide offi  ce to monitor the quality of representa-
tion parents receive, and establishing an administrative 
case review process in which parents can participate, 
are some of the other many possibilities for reform. 
Although these measures themselves will not cure all 
the problems that ail the child welfare system, they 
will increase the likelihood that parents will engage 
with the system and voluntarily accept decisions made 
against them. Restoring the confi dence of parents in 
the child welfare system will only increase positive 
outcomes for children in care. 
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Endnotes
1  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.19a (West 2002) (“If 
parental rights to the child have not been terminated 
and the court determines at a permanency planning 
hearing that the return of the child to his or her parent 
would not cause a substantial risk of harm to the child’s 
life, physical health, or mental well-being, the court 
shall order the child returned to his or her parent.”)
2  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann § 712A.1(3) (West 2002). 
3  See Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t Of Health & Human 
Services, Th e Afcars Report, Fy 2005 Estimates As Of 
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